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four countries has been mixed, as Table 1 indicates.
Argentina made several unsuccessful attempts at
stabilization before initiating its April 1991 program,
which still endures; Bolivia enjoyed an immediate
and lasting end to inflation in mid-1985; and
Mexico experienced a gradual and lasting end to
inflation, while Brazil has yet to control inflation
for any substantial length of time. Table 1 also
provides figures on the changes in real economic
activity taking place around each of the inflationary
episodes. Each successful stabilization, regardless
of whether it came about in a gradual or a short-
lived fashion, has been accompanied by no worse
than a temporary drop in output.
Economists generally accept the view that
inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon.
Nevertheless, there are rather divergent opinions
on the short- and long-run interactions between
the monetary and the real sectors. So far, there
has been no theoretical consensus on the macro-
economic trade-offs, if any, between inflation and
output. Moreover, it is difficult to discriminate
empirically between alternative views on inflation–
output trade-offs.
For a simple example, consider the “child’s
game” in Figure 1, in which we plot inflation and
High Inflation: Causes and Consequences
lthough cases of very high inflation and hyper-
inflation may at first seem like unusual events,
in recent years these economic scourges have
been all too common. Using the conventional
definition of hyperinflation as a monthly inflation
rate of more than 50 percent, there were no hyper-
inflations in the world between 1950 and 1983 but
seven in the second half of the 1980s. Further-
more, the 1980s brought approximately twenty
episodes of high inflation (rates exceeding 100
percent in a twelve-month period), originating in
nine Latin American countries.
In this article, we try to answer a series of
questions that can at least offer some guidance for
understanding the economics of high inflation.
First, what are the costs of inflation compared with
the costs of lowering inflation? Second, why is
inflation chronically high in most Latin American
countries? The fact that Latin American countries
have suffered high and chronic inflation through-
out most of the past three decades may suggest
some commonality in the processes that determine
inflation. Third, what are the main causes of these
inflationary episodes? Finally, why have some
countries successfully lowered inflation while
others have not? Successful stabilization by some
governments but not others probably reflects the
perception that the costs of inflation have become
unacceptable to those societies that stabilized. We
try to understand what creates such a change in
perception.
In Table 1, we summarize the inflationary
experiences of four Latin American countries—
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico—beginning
in the mid-1980s. All four experienced high infla-
tion, with periods of hyperinflation in Argentina
during 1989, in Bolivia during 1985, and in Brazil
during 1990. Success in stabilizing inflation in theFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 38
Table 1
Summary of High-Inflation Episodes
Inflation rate Output Growth Around
Country (Percent) Stabilization (Percent)
Argentina 434 (1983) –.67 (1985:2)
688 (1984) –5.39 (1985:3)
Peak inflation rates (per episode): 387 (1985) 13.5 (1985:4)
31 percent (June 1985), 82 (1986) 4.1 (1987)
190 percent (1989:3) 175 (1987) –5.2 (1988)
388 (1988) –4.1 (1989:3)
Success in stabilizing: 4,145 (1989) –4.5 (1989)
very temporary (before April 1991) 1,629 (1990) .4 (1990)
923 (1991)
22 (1991:2–1992:2)
Bolivia 276 (1983) 33.3 (1985:2)
1,281 (1984) –25.7 (1985:3)
Peak inflation rate: 8,175 (1985) 15.2 (1985:4)
66 percent (June 1985) 14.6 (1986) –2.9 (1986)
16.0 (1987) 2.1 (1987)
15.2 (1988) 3.0 (1988)
Success in stabilizing: 16.5 (1989) 3.2 (average 1989–1991)
yes, immediate 17.4 (1990)
16.2 (1991)
Brazil 178 (1983) –2.5 (1983)
197 (1984) 5.7 (1984)
Peak inflation rates (per episode): 227 (1985) 8.3 (1985)
20 percent (February 1986), 145 (1986) 7.6 (1986)
24 percent (June 1987) 225 (1987)  3.6 (1987)
33 percent (January 1989), 1,038 (1988) –.01 (1988)
59 percent (March 1990) 1,759 (1989) 3.3 (1989)
Success in stabilizing: 1,658 (1990) –4.1 (1990)
only temporarily 494 (1991)
1,147 (1992)
Mexico 29 (1981)
99 (1982) –.6 (1982)
Peak inflation rates (per episode): 81 (1983) –4.2 (1983)
11 percent (August 1982), 59 (1984) 3.6 (1984)
15 percent (December 1987) 64 (1985)  2.6 (1985)
106 (1986) –3.7 (1986)
Success in stabilizing: 159 (1987) 1.6 (1987)
very temporary (before December 1989) 45 (1988)  1.4 (1988)
20 (1989) 2.9 (1989)
24 (1990) 4.9 (1990)
19 (1991) 3.9 (1991)
12 (1992)
NOTES: Any rate quoted for a given month is a monthly rate, for a quarter is a quarterly rate, and for a year is an annual rate. Attempted
stabilization occurred on the date following each peak inflation noted in the table. The sources of the data are as follows, where
IFS denotes that the data are from various issues of the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
Argentina (IFS): consumer price inflation, line 64; and real GDP in 1978 prices, line 99bp.
Bolivia (Bulletin of the Central Bank of Bolivia): consumer price inflation; and real GDP in 1980 prices.
Brazil (IFS and Boletin Mensal do Banco Central do Brasil): consumer price inflation, line 64; and general industrial
production index, 3/86=100.
Mexico (IFS and the Central Bank of Mexico’s Economic Indicators): consumer price inflation, line 64; and industrial
production, base year = 1980.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 39
Figure 1
Inflation–Output Trade-Offs: A Child’s Game
Below are plots for real inflation and output for four different countries over a ten-year period. The game is to match each
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output series for four countries over a period of
thirty quarters. The inflation series are plotted in a
random order in the left panels and are labeled
AP, BP, CP, and DP; the output series are plotted
in a different order in the right panels and are
labeled AY, BY, CY, and DY. The object of the
game is to select pairs (say, for example, AP and
BY) that correctly match each country’s inflation
series with its output series. (Answers are given in
the concluding section.) As the reader may find,
ocular inspection offers no clues to the correct
answers, which indicates that even in the short
run, there have been no apparent gains in output
growth as a result of increased inflation.
Explaining why different societies end up
with different inflation rates is a difficult task that
has largely been left unaccomplished by econo-
mists. To glean the similarities and differences
between inflation experiences, we briefly review
the experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and
Mexico. The inflationary processes and the failed
attempts at stabilization reflect three common
features:
1. no apparent gains in output growth as a
result of increases in inflation,
2. high fiscal deficits, and
3. public skepticism about the government’s
commitment to fighting inflation.
Successful stabilization, on the other hand,
combined fiscal adjustment with some set of
policies that enhanced the credibility of the
government:
1. outward commitments to fixed exchange
rates,
2. increased independence of the central
bank, or
3. “social pacts” that spread the burden of
adjustment across sectors and imposed
commitment on the government’s actions.
Finally, we give theoretical content to these
conclusions. Specifically, we look at the relation-
ship between money printed to finance govern-
ment deficits and inflation. We find that more than
one outcome is possible. Typically, one outcome
involves high inflation and the other involves low
inflation. A successful move from the high infla-
tion outcome to the low inflation outcome involves
not only reducing government deficits and money
creation but also convincing the public that the
government is strongly committed to lower inflation.
Historical experiences with high inflation
Argentina. Significant changes took place in the
Argentine economy after 1975. Until 1991, inflation
never fell below an annual rate of 100 percent,
while the liberalization policies of 1977–80 brought
increased indebtedness and capital flight. In the
ten years before the 1985 Austral Plan, real gross
domestic product (GDP) rose at an average annual
rate of 0.5 percent, inflation was 11 percent per
month, the fiscal deficit never fell below 5 percent
of GDP, and external debt rose by $42 billion. In
1983, a combination of events led to an upward
adjustment in wages and acceleration of inflation
to an annual rate beyond 400 percent.
The Austral Plan, announced in April 1985,
was a “heterodox shock” program, in which the
government took actions to contract aggregate
demand and directly control wages and prices.
Realigning relative prices was required if the pro-
gram was to reduce inflation without severe short-
ages. Thus, it was announced that between April
and June, controls on many industrial prices
would be removed, utility rates and beef prices
would rise, and there would be a real devaluation.
During the stabilization, prices were to be frozen
at levels prevailing on a specified date in June.
An agreement was signed with the International
Monetary Fund, and Argentina pledged to stop
issuing money to finance the fiscal deficit, which
would be financed entirely with external credit. The
budget deficit was reduced through an increase in
revenues, in part due to increased real activity
following the freeze and reduced income tax
postponement with lower inflation.
The effects on inflation were felt immediately.
The wholesale price index, which rose 42.3 percent
in June 1985, fell by 0.9 percent in the following
month. These figures are testimony to the success
in eliminating the inertial component of inflation.
However, fundamental imbalances persisted and
eventually drove inflation higher. In particular,
relative prices fluctuated significantly, mostly as a
result of higher prices for foodstuffs and services,
which were initially frozen at levels well below
equilibrium. The price freeze lasted nine months.
An attempt in March 1986 to alter relative prices
and save the plan failed within three months.
Inflation continued to grow in the late 1980s,
until Argentina once again faced hyperinflation inEconomic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 41
1989. Monthly inflation reached 196 percent for
July 1989 under the new president, Carlos Menem,
and gave rise to the Bunge–Born stabilization
program. The attempted stabilization consisted of
exchange rate stabilization, price “agreements”
between producers, partial trade liberalization, and
promised fiscal adjustment. Lack of true fiscal
adjustment led to the collapse of the stabilization
program in December 1989 and a return to hyper-
inflation. A subsequent program to refinance the
government debt, dubbed the Bonex Plan, amounted
to a forced confiscation of liquidity in the finan-
cial system. This caused real interest rates to rise
dramatically, and depressed economic growth, but
did not bring inflation down to a desirable level.
In late 1990, a run on the currency moved Argen-
tina back to hyperinflation.
In April 1991, a new stabilization package
was put in place under the auspices of Economy
Minister Domingo Cavallo. This plan included the
elimination of the budget deficit, monetary strin-
gency, privatization, and the introduction of a
new currency—the peso—whose value would be
rigidly fixed against the U.S. dollar. The plan
achieved a dramatic reduction in inflation and has
enjoyed continued success for two full years.
Bolivia. Unlike many of its neighbors, Bolivia did
not suffer chronic inflation before 1982. However,
by the end of 1981, Bolivia had an overvalued
currency, a large fiscal deficit, and external debt.
Consumption levels were maintained by recourse
to new and expensive short-term loans. An abrupt
reversal of the earlier net foreign resource inflows
occurred in 1982 and set Bolivia on the path to
hyperinflation.
The first of several stabilization programs
was announced soon after the inauguration of the
civilian president, Hernan Siles-Zuazo, in October
1982. The plan contained some standard measures
designed to correct relative price imbalances,
while other measures—such as price ceilings for
essential goods and interest rates, a fixed exchange
rate with exchange controls, and wage indexation
—were heterodox. The plan failed almost immedi-
ately. By February 1983, the premium in the black
market for foreign exchange was 100 percent.
After March, inflation accelerated. Consequently,
the price controls created excess demand and a
thriving black market for basic items. Furthermore,
the fiscal sector was adversely affected because
prices for publicly provided goods lagged behind
inflation, because the overvalued currency impaired
public enterprises producing for export, and
because of the large deficit resulting from the
administrative lag of tax collection. Central bank
policies resulted in rapid money creation, and
there was a buildup of arrears on the external
and internal public debt.
Several other attempts at stabilization failed
to prevent hyperinflation. Average monthly infla-
tion between March 1984 and August 1985 was 43
percent; in February 1985, it was 182 percent.
General economic decline accompanied the rise
in inflation; real GDP growth was negative in 1983,
1984, and 1985 (and again in 1986), and the rate
of investment (to GDP) sank to a record low of
6.5 percent in 1985.
Economic deterioration was so severe that by
August 1985 Bolivia seemed ripe for stabilization.
A new, center-right government led by Victor Paz
Estenssoro ruled with the support of business. In
addition, the real value of the money base was low,
long-term peso contracts had virtually disappeared,
wage indexation schemes were discredited (as
were the unions), the economy was extremely
dollarized, and there was strong social demand for
stabilization, even for shock treatment. Supreme
Decree 21060, the New Economic Policy (NEP), was
declared on August 29, 1985. The NEP featured a
fiscal package, market liberalization, exchange
rate unification, a new currency, and the establish-
ment of an anchor for inflation.
A fiscal stabilization package, including
several dramatic measures on both the revenue and
spending sides, was instituted along with market
liberalization. There were sharp increases in the
price of gasoline and other petroleum products
produced by state-owned enterprises. Public-sector
wages were frozen. Many state enterprises either
were privatized or had drastic cuts in employment
(23,000 of 30,000 miners were discharged, for
example). In addition, public-sector investment and
foreign debt servicing were temporarily frozen.
Liberalization took the form of eliminating many
price ceilings, opening the financial sector, reform-
ing the labor market, and eliminating barriers to
international and domestic trade.
The plan resulted in a dramatic drop in
inflation. Except for first-quarter 1986, quarterly
inflation remained below 8.1 percent. OutputFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 42
declines accompanied the drop in inflation; in 1986,
real GDP fell more than 3 percent, unemployment
rose to 20 percent, and investment was near an
all-time low. Exacerbating matters were adverse
external shocks, such as the collapse of the tin
market and the drop in natural gas sales, which
contributed to unfavorable terms of trade in 1986.
Although Bolivia achieved positive real growth
in 1987 and 1988, real GDP at the end of 1988
was still below the 1983 level (especially in per
capita terms). While the official numbers exclude
illegal and underground activities, the failure to
achieve positive growth of real per capita GDP is
surely the most disappointing feature of the NEP.
But continued success in curtailing the fiscal deficit
has allowed Bolivia to renew foreign sources of
finance and moderately expand money growth, and
is viewed as the key to sustaining the success of
the plan. Inflation has remained under 20 percent
at an annual rate, and GDP has grown modestly.
Brazil. Annual inflation in Brazil was approxi-
mately 30 to 40 percent for most of the 1970s. In
1978, imprudent policy measures, including more
rapid adjustments in nominal wages from twelve
to six months, contributed to an acceleration of
inflation. Between 1980 and 1982, inflation was
stable at around 100 percent, but a reacceleration
took place in 1983 and 1984.
Following a short-lived reform package that
accompanied a civilian government’s passage into
power in March 1985, three stabilization plans
were attempted. The first and most famous of
these, the Cruzado Plan, was implemented in Feb-
ruary 1986. This plan was heterodox (like Argentina’s
and Israel’s 1985 stabilization packages), calling
for a price and wage freeze and imposing formulas
for adjusting wages, rents, and mortgages. Notably,
policymakers believed there was no need for
fiscal adjustment, as the budget deficit amounted to
only 0.5 percent of GDP. The plan was implemented
in the midst of favorable external developments:
Brazil had registered large trade surpluses in the
previous two years, world oil prices and interest
rates were falling, and the dollar was depreciating
against major currencies. The initial results of the
Cruzado Plan were favorable, as inflation was
stopped in its tracks without a recession.
The euphoria that greeted the plan led to the
ill-advised maintenance of the price freeze. How-
ever, prices were frozen at levels prevailing on a
given day (in this case, February 27, 1986), when
there was no reason to believe that relative prices
were in equilibrium. This policy ultimately created
shortages and spurred black market activity. In
mid-1986, demand was clearly overheated by the
real wage increases and the budget deficit, which
was nearly 5 percent of GDP by late 1986. The
failure of the original Cruzado Plan led to Cruzado-
II, which was announced on July 24, 1986. This
attempt at fiscal reform was no more successful
than its predecessor, nor were the Bresser Plan of
June 1987 and the Summer Plan of January 1989.
A radical stabilization package, introduced
by President Fernando Collor in March 1990, froze
80 percent of the financial liabilities of the financial
system, putting them into an account at the central
bank. Real interest rates rose dramatically due to a
combination of liquidity confiscation and lack of
government credibility in honoring its debts. Infla-
tion fell, but never to acceptable levels. Mean-
while, the economy moved into its worst recession
in history, largely because liquidity confiscation
froze most of producers’ working capital. Absent
any real deficit reduction, inflationary pressures
eventually mounted toward the end of 1990.
Another income-based stabilization plan, Collor-II,
was announced in January 1991, but lack of fiscal
adjustment destroyed the program by March 1991.
The situation in Brazil, on the brink of hyper-
inflation, contrasts sharply with that of Bolivia
recently. Inflation in Brazil has averaged well over
1,000 percent each year from 1988 through mid-
1993. Although the government continues to
struggle toward fiscal control, Brazil seems to be
moving toward a more open trade regime and a
deregulated business environment. In response, the
stock market has boomed, but income inequality
and inflation remain serious problems.
Mexico. With the discovery of vast oil reserves,
the performance of the Mexican economy between
1978 and 1981 was impressive: annual GDP growth
was never less than 8 percent, while the inflation
rate stayed in the range of 20 percent. However,
Mexico’s return to statist policies became apparent.
For example, public-sector expenditure increased
in real terms by 97.7 percent from 1977 to 1981,
for a jump from 29.5 to 41.3 percent of GDP. The
budget deficit grew from 6.7 to 14.7 percent of
GDP during this period, because failure to main-
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significant rise in tax revenue. The exchange rate,
which was ostensibly flexible, rose at an average
annual rate of only 3.6 percent during these years.
The budget deficit and real appreciation led to a
128-percent rise in the volume of imported inter-
mediate inputs. This increase coincided with
higher output and employment and, eventually,
problematic inflation rates, balance of payments
deficits, and a burdensome foreign debt.
Failed attempts at adjustment in late 1981 and
early 1982, amid several signs of serious economic
problems, reflected the weakness of President José
López Portillo’s economic policy-making. A 67-
percent devaluation in February 1982, new external
loans, planned cuts in public spending, and in-
creases in public-sector prices were not enough to
stop the flight out of peso-denominated assets
and Mexdollars. The economic crisis unfolded in
August 1982 with a devaluation of nearly 100
percent, the introduction of a dual exchange rate
system, price hikes on staples, and a forced con-
version of Mexdollars into pesos. These were
followed by the nationalization of the banks that
September and a moratorium on foreign debt pay-
ments until a rescheduling agreement was reached
in December 1982. In 1982 annual inflation reached
100 percent, while the real GDP growth rate was
negative for the first time in 50 years.
President Miguel de la Madrid’s administration
began in 1983 with a wide-ranging program of
stabilization and reform, along with negotiations
over the foreign debt. Fiscal austerity, lower money
growth rates, and improvement on the external
accounts were prominent goals of the program,
just as in 1976. During this time, Mexico achieved
much success in meeting its targets. From 1982 to
1983, the public-sector deficit was halved (to 8.9
percent of GDP), money growth rates declined in
both real and nominal terms, and the current
account balance went from a $6 billion deficit to
a $5 billion surplus, in large part due to tight
controls on imports.
Success in meeting the targets initially was
accompanied by a deep recession—real GDP
growth was –5.3 percent in 1983—with only a
slight drop in inflation to 80 percent. Furthermore,
the effects of import compression—squeezing
imports to reverse the current account deficit—
and deep cuts in capital expenditures on long-
term growth prospects were disconcerting. In
1984 and early 1985, real GDP growth improved
modestly, inflation fell into the 60-percent range,
and the current account remained in surplus. At
the same time, the budget deficit began to rise
slightly, and plans for a fiscal correction were
announced in March 1985. Money growth was
strictly controlled despite the fiscal deficits, which
were financed by sales of government bonds
(CETES) to the banking system and public.
In the second half of 1985, the economy
slipped back into recession, as world oil prices fell,
a huge earthquake hit Mexico City, and monetary
policy was tight. Oil prices continued to fall in
1986, and the public-sector deficit rose to 16.3
percent of GDP, despite measures to cut spending
and increase taxes. Monetary and fiscal contraction
continued, and an increase in the rate of peso
depreciation was implemented to cushion the
blow falling oil prices could cause to the balance
of payments. At the time, Mexico faced stagflation:
real GDP growth was –3.8 percent, and the rate of
inflation reached 106 percent in 1986. The economy’s
performance in 1987 was no better: although real
GDP growth was positive, inflation rose to 160
percent. The Pacto de Solidaridad Economica
program was undertaken in late 1987 under the
de la Madrid administration. The peso was frozen
at 2,281 per dollar for most of 1988 immediately
after a severe devaluation in late 1987.
In late 1989, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari renewed the program as the Pacto para
Estabilizacion e Crecimiento Economico by incor-
porating tax reform combined with exchange rate
devaluation guidance. The administration’s con-
tinuation of trade liberalization and normalization
of relations with creditors produced benefits.
Mexico became the first country to participate in
the Brady Plan for debt restructuring and began
negotiating the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment with the United States and Canada. After
1989, inflation fell sharply, accompanied by a
gradual appreciation of the peso. In 1990, capital
started to flow to Mexico, and by 1992, the Mexican
government had accrued a budget surplus of
about 0.5 percent of GDP.
Summary. Historical experiences of four high-
inflation Latin American countries suggest some
common features of their inflationary processes
and failed attempts at stabilization: no apparent
gains in output growth as a result of increases inFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 44
inflation, high fiscal deficits, and public skepticism
about government’s commitment to fighting infla-
tion. Conversely, successful stabilization in Bolivia
in 1985 and, to a lesser degree, in Argentina in
1991 and Mexico in 1989 involved combined fiscal
adjustment with credibility-enhancing policies
through outward commitments to fixed exchange
rates, increasing independence of central banks,
or social pacts that negotiated the burden of
adjustment across sectors and imposed commit-
ment on the correspondent government actions.1
Costs of inflation and stabilization
Since Milton Friedman and Walter Heller
debated the welfare consequences of monetary
policy, the real cost of inflation has become a
central macroeconomic issue. Sargent’s (1986) study
of four episodes of hyperinflation, which indicates
that real costs of stabilization are present but not
large, has added to the controversy.2 In this section,
we investigate the welfare costs of inflation and
discuss the real costs of stabilization. We draw
empirical evidence from the high-inflation experi-
ences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico.
Costs of inflation. Generally, four types of costs
are associated with inflation created from mone-
tary expansion. First, higher inflation raises money
holding costs, thus encouraging more frequent
banking and exchanges. As a consequence, there
will be larger transactions costs, including shoe-
leather or wheelbarrow (transportation) costs for
banking or making exchanges, information costs
for conducting future trading, and time costs for
traveling.3 Second, with higher inflation, sellers
need to change menus and advertising, as well as
their decisions about employment and investment,
more frequently, adding to adjustment costs.4
Third, increased uncertainty about future trading
will result from higher inflation and lead to larger
risk premiums in various financial market returns.5
Finally, different opportunity costs associated with
higher inflation and the different responses that
result will lead to a misallocation of production
inputs, goods outputs, and time devoted to various
economic activities.6
In a traditional partial-equilibrium, monetary-
exchange setup, the welfare costs of inflation can
be measured by approximating the area under the
money demand function (that is, the Harberger
triangle).7 Fischer (1981) and Lucas (1981) apply
this method to obtain estimates of the welfare cost
of inflation to be between 0.3 and 0.45 percent of
gross national product (GNP). Using a general-
equilibrium cash-in-advance model that assumes
cash is required prior to goods purchases, Cooley
and Hansen (1989) find similar estimates. However,
if distortionary taxes such as taxes on labor and
capital income are considered, as in Cooley and
Hansen (1991), inflation distortions combine with
tax distortions, doubling the welfare loss. Wang
and Yip (1993), on the other hand, allow monetary
growth to affect the engine of economic growth
by retarding the accumulation of human capital,
and find a much higher welfare cost of about 3.6
percent of GNP, a number that is not negligible.
Without doubt, overexpansion of money
supply leads to welfare reductions in the long run.
Moreover, the Latin American experience suggests
the absence of a short-run Phillips curve, implying
that even the short-run gain of expansionary
monetary policy may not be present. With this in
mind, we consider the potential costs associated
with ending inflation.
Costs of Stabilization. Efforts to end inflation
almost always seem to be associated with recession.
The lost output associated with inflation reduction
is what is referred to as the “costs” of stabilization.
Table 1 implies that this association, although
1 For a more detailed historical review and statistical dis-
plays, the reader is referred to Bruno, Di Tella, Dornbusch,
and Fischer (1987), Bruno et al. (1991), Welch (1991),
McLeod and Welch (1991), Rogers (1992), and Rogers and
Wang (1992).
2 See Garber (1982) and Wicker (1986).
3 See Saving (1971) and Drazen (1979).
4 See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Rotemberg (1983), and
Rotemberg and Summers (1990).
5 See Cukierman (1980) and Ball and Cecchetti (1991).
6 See Garber (1982), Rogers and Wang (1993), and Wang
and Yip (1992), respectively.
7 The following welfare cost measures have been computed
on U.S. data.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 45
temporary, is prevalent in these high-inflation
countries and was reinforced by casual empiricism
of the low-inflation, developed countries in the
1980s. Stabilization, or disinflation, may be costly
for several reasons. For simplicity, we break these
explanations into the two camps discussed below.
First, New Keynesians emphasize costs
arising from contractionary aggregate demand
policies in the presence of nominal rigidities, or
inertia in wages and prices, which arise because
of staggered or backward-looking contracts and/
or menu costs. Intuitively, with staggered price-
setting behavior, some firms set prices before the
announcement of a fully credible stabilization
program. With these prices set for periods lasting
beyond the program itself, prices are too high. A
potentially long-lasting recession ensues because
no cohort of price-setters desires to be the first to
cut prices. This analysis is based upon the work
of Taylor (1979) and Blanchard (1983).
These results suggest that stabilization pro-
grams should be implemented gradually. As applied
to high-inflation episodes, this school recommends
that incomes policies—in other words, some type
of wage and price controls—be implemented.
Stabilization programs that have followed such
policies have come to be known as heterodox.
Bruno, Di Tella, Dornbusch, and Fischer (1987) pro-
vide an excellent discussion of heterodox stabiliza-
tion programs. They show that in Argentina, Brazil,
and Peru, three heterodox programs failed, while
in Israel (in mid-1985) and Mexico (in late 1989),
heterodox methods were used with more success.
Second, the New Classical school emphasizes
the problems in making a promised stabilization
credible. The credibility problem is made more
difficult, it is argued, by the implementation of
policies. Instead, inflation may be reduced without
much of a cost in terms of lost output if the gov-
ernment pursues an ambitious plan of attack
centered on tightening domestic credit and elimi-
nating the budget deficit. This is the so-called
shock-treatment approach to stabilization. With-
out the frictions of the New Keynesian models,
New Classical analysis asserts that only orthodox
measures, such as fiscal and monetary discipline,
are necessary to end inflation, as long as the pro-
gram achieves credibility.
Sargent (1986) presents evidence that the ends
of four major episodes of inflation were associated
with real costs, though not nearly as large as was
predicted by the believers of the inflation–output
trade-offs. Sargent elaborates on the inflation–
output trade-offs by concluding that in the Austrian
case, the “cost in increased unemployment and
foregone output was minor compared with the
$220 billion GNP that some current analysts esti-
mate would be lost in the U.S. per one percentage
point inflation reduction.” For the much-discussed
German episode, Sargent states the reasons to
expect real effects from stabilization: “There is
little doubt that the ‘irrational’ structure of capital
characterizing Germany after stabilization led to
subsequent problems of adjustment in labor and
other markets.” Garber (1982) and Rogers and Wang
(1993) examine this by-product of stabilization.
More recently, Bolivia in 1985 eliminated a
much higher inflation than had Israel or Mexico,
and did so without employing any heterodox
elements. In fact, the Bolivians actually deregulated
almost all prices at the start of the stabilization
program. What is common among each of these
successful stabilization programs and the ongoing
Argentine stabilization is strong budgetary adjust-
ment. Historical experience has shown that dras-
tically reducing or eliminating the budget deficit
to ensure credibility for the tight-money policy is
absolutely essential for successful stabilization, as
the Brazilians have unfortunately discovered from
the other side of the fence.
Finally, in several high-inflation episodes,
governments delayed for some time before launch-
ing a coherent stabilization program. Examples of
recent literature on the timing of stabilization
policies include Sargent and Wallace (1986), Drazen
and Helpman (1987, 1990), and Alesina and Drazen
(1991). Given the need for credibility, there is
widespread belief that the longer the government
waits to attack inflation, the more damage to the
economy, and hence, the more costly will be the
policies needed to stabilize the economy.
Why, then, do governments delay stabiliza-
tion? One answer may be that policymakers are
irrational, but this conclusion is less than satisfac-
tory because it might explain any behavior. For
Alesina and Drazen (1991), the problem is distri-
butional. In their model, the costs of stabilization
are borne by heterogeneous groups that are not
necessarily affected to the same degree. Because
these groups are in competition to shift the burdenFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 46
of stabilization onto others, stabilization is delayed
by a “war of attrition.” Alesina and Drazen (1991)
illustrate how the expected date of stabilization is
affected by various characteristics of the economy,
such as income inequality, political cohesion, and
the extent of monetization of the budget deficit.
Historical experience that shows extremely diverse
stabilization outcomes lends support to the pre-
dictions of this line of research.
Summary. These considerations lead to four main
conclusions. First, the short-run welfare or output
gain of expansionary monetary policy may not be
present. Second, by taking into account  the plaus-
ible adverse growth effect of inflation through
resources misallocation, the welfare costs of even
moderate inflation may be very significant (perhaps
as high as 3.6 percent of GNP). Third, though
there were real costs associated with stabilization
in several high-inflation episodes, such adverse
macroeconomic effects have been mostly temporary.
Finally, ensuring credibility is not only essential to
controlling inflation but important in minimizing
the corresponding real costs of stabilization.
Causes of inflation
Inflation is a long-term, persistent increase
in the price level. From the quantity theory identity
that money stock times velocity is equal to the
price level multiplied by real output, one can specify
the rate of inflation as monetary growth + rate of
change in velocity – output growth. In an open
economy, both domestic and foreign structural
changes and policy alterations can affect inflation.
For demonstration purposes, this article considers
three types of policy instruments—fiscal, mone-
tary (domestic credit), and external (nominal
exchange rate)—in addition to structural output
(domestic net of foreign) disturbances.
To study how these disturbances affect the
rate of inflation, we construct a modified model of
an inflation trap.8 Following the view that inflation
in the long run is a monetary phenomenon, we
focus primarily on the money market and its
dynamic adjustment process.
Money market equilibrium condition (MM).
We begin by considering a modified Cagan (1956)
money demand model. This type of model has been
broadly used in studies of high inflation or hyper-
inflation. Specifically, money demand (md) can be
thought of as a decreasing function of the expected
rate of inflation (πe), since higher expected infla-
tion reduces the real value of money. Unlike Cagan
(1956), who restricted economic individuals to
reliance on past information only, we assume that
individuals have rational expectations and thus
utilize all information available and form predic-
tions with no systematic errors. Thus, letting
expected inflation be primarily driven by the pre-
announced rate of money growth (µ), we can
express money demand function as an exponen-
tial function of µ:
Money market equilibrium requires money demand
be equal to (real) money supply, md = m, which
implies
This relationship indicates that in money market
equilibrium, money growth and real money balances
are negatively related. After normalizing popula-
tion and exogenous technological growth as zero,
the actual inflation rate in the short run may deviate
from the preannounced rate of money growth:
where θ denotes the deviation of inflation from
the (preannounced) money growth rate. This
deviation measure may depend on disturbances to
productivity, the nominal exchange rate, govern-
ment size, central bank credibility, and/or any
other shifters, such as exogenous foreign shocks,
oil-price shocks, and policy shocks that involve
price and wage controls (fiats) during high-inflation
episodes. Later, we shall refer to this negative
relationship between inflation and real money
balances, equation 3, as an MM (money market
equilibrium) locus in (m,π)-space.
Steady-state equilibrium condition (SS). So far,
we have not discussed how the dynamics of the
inflationary process may reach a steady state. To
8 Our model is a modification of that used by Bruno and
Fischer (1990).
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complete this analysis, we introduce a standard
steady-state equilibrium condition, which requires
the rate of change of real money balances to be
zero—that is, m ˙/m = 0.
To account for inflationary finance, we
follow Sargent and Wallace (1973) by incorporat-
ing the real government deficit, d, into the
analytical framework. Rather than treating d as
given, we specify it as
where D represents the ex ante real government
deficit, η can be thought of as deviation of actual
from ex ante real government deficit, and dD/dπ
> 0. An increase in the inflation rate reduces the
real value of income tax revenue given the time
lags involved in tax collections, thus enlarging the
government budget deficit through an increase in
D. This is usually referred to as the Olivera (1967)–
Tanzi (1977) effect. For simplicity, we assume that
the Olivera–Tanzi effect is not strong enough to
alter the structure of the dynamic system. More
specifically, we require that the inflation elasticity
of government deficit (), which is, for analytic
convenience, assumed to be constant, is strictly
less than unity; for an alternative case, the reader
is referred to Bruno and Fischer (1990). The devia-
tion of actual from ex ante real government deficit,
on the other hand, may respond to changes in
productivity and the size of government.
Since income or sales taxes have been con-
sidered in the above relationship, the deficit must
be financed ex ante by the inflation tax in the
short run—that is, d = µm, where the rate of
nominal money supply growth, µ, can be thought
as the ex ante rate of the inflation tax, and real
money balances, m, can be reinterpreted as the
inflation tax base. Therefore, the government will
adjust money supply according to the following
equation that specifies the evolution of real money
balances as the difference between the nominal
money supply growth rate and the inflation rate:
Substituting the government deficit specification,
equation 4, into the real money balances adjust-
ment equation, equation 5, we obtain the following
steady-state equilibrium condition:
Given the deviation term, η, inflation and real
money balances are negatively related, provided
that the Olivera–Tanzi effect is not too strong.
This relationship, equation 6, will later be referred
to as the SS (steady-state equilibrium) locus in
(m,π)-space. Notably, this SS curve approaches
the horizontal and vertical axes asymptotically.
Determination of the full dynamic equilib-
rium. We are now prepared to illustrate the full
dynamic equilibrium using the MM and SS loci,
equations 3 and 6, in Figure 2. Recall that the SS
curve approaches the two axes asymptotically. To
ensure the existence of a full dynamic equilibrium,
we assume that the government deficit is not too
large. Then the MM curve must intersect the SS
curve at least once, and a full dynamic equilibrium
therefore exists.
The next question is whether the full dynamic
equilibrium is unique. To proceed, we need to
assume that even when the rate of inflation ap-
proaches zero, there is an upper bound on real
money holdings, mmax, which is finite. Furthermore,
we assume that as inflation becomes uncontrol-
lable, real money holdings approach zero faster
than inflation—that is, πm approaches zero as π
goes to infinity. Under these two assumptions, we
are able to express the ex post Laffer curve of the
inflationary tax in Figure 3, which plots the ex post
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inflation tax rate, π. As the reader can see, for a
given level of deficit, d0, there are two correspond-
ing rates of inflation, π1 and π2. In fact, the same
conclusion can be reached by depicting the infla-
tion rate, π, against logged real money balances,
ln(m). One can easily show that the relationship
described in equation 3 is now a straight line with
a negative slope and positive intercepts, while the
relationship displayed in equation 6 is a down-
ward-sloping curve, convex toward the origin.
Provided that the government deficit is not too
large, the presence of two full dynamic equilibria
can again be verified. Thus, examining Figure 2 in
the (m,π)-space, we learn that the MM and SS
curves in this case must intersect twice such that
one deficit level can correspond to two different
rates of inflation (see points A and E, for example).
We now turn to studying the local stability
property of the model. We assume that in transi-
tion to a steady state, the money market is always
in equilibrium. Thus, dynamic movements after
any perturbation must be along the MM curve.
Consider an initial position at point B, which lies
above the SS curve. For a given level of inflation,
real money balances are higher than the steady-
state level and from equation 5, m ˙ /m must be nega-
tive. This implies that the dynamic adjustment must
be to reduce m and hence to move toward point E.
By contrast, if the economy starts from an initial
point below the SS curve, say C (or D), then the
dynamic adjustment process must be to increase
m and hence to move away from A (or toward E).
The discussion above indicates that point A,
which is associated with a lower inflation rate, is
unstable—that is, any disturbance will lead the
dynamics away from A. On the contrary, point E,
which exhibits higher inflation, turns out to be a
stable full dynamic equilibrium. In other words, a
country in this circumstance may end up in an
“inflation trap” (point E) in which inflation is per-
sistently high. This may explain why the four Latin
American countries have experienced chronically
high inflation.
By affecting the two deviation terms, θ and η,
a policy that either tightens money supply growth
with enhanced credibility, or retains the foreign
exchange value of the currency,9 or imposes fiats
(price control or wage freeze) may shift the two
curves such that the MM curve intersects the SS
curve only once, and from below. The possibility
of a unique intersection can be readily seen using
Figure 3. With a credible tight-money policy, it may
set an upper bound for the rate of inflation, say
πmax < πs, which ensures a one-to-one relationship
between d and  , corresponding to the  upward-
sloping portion of the ex post Laffer curve. In this
case, one can avoid the inflation trap and free the
economy from a sustained high rate of inflation.
In Figure 4, we illustrate this sort of success-
ful tight-money policy by examining the paths of
logged nominal money stock and logged price
level. The slope of the logged nominal money
stock measures the (nominal) money growth rate,
while the slope of the logged price level measures
the (actual) inflation rate. In the long run, these
two paths are parallel to each other, as indicated
by equation 3 with θ = 0. The vertical difference
then measures logged real money balances. Given
ensured credibility, a tight-money policy imposed
at time T  makes the path of nominal money flatter.
As a consequence, real money demand, m, increases
because of the reduction in anticipated inflation,
as indicated in equation 1, leading to an instanta-
neous drop in the price level. Upon accomplishment
of this successful anti-inflation policy, the economy
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9 See Chen (1973) and Rogers (1992) for further elaboration
on currency substitution and its macroeconomic conse-
quences.
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rate, as reflected by the flatter path of the price level.
Summary. These considerations lead to two main
conclusions. First, a country may end up in a
high-inflation trap, thus lending theoretical support
to the chronically high-inflation experiences faced
by the four Latin American countries for some
periods. Second, some stabilization policies may
not break up the inflation-trap structure, as in
Argentina (before April 1991), Brazil (even into
1993), and Mexico (by late 1989), where the success
of their stabilization programs, if any, was at best
temporary; conversely, a successful stabilization
that ensures credibility and restores market mecha-
nism may move an economy quickly out of the
inflation trap, as witnessed in Bolivia after its 1985
hyperinflation. In summary, our model explains
the rather diverse stabilization outcomes reflected
in Table 1 and demonstrates that a country without
a properly specified, well-executed stabilization
program may never be able to control inflation for
a substantial length of time.
Conclusions
Recalling Figure 1, we provide the reader
with the answers to the child’s game: Argentina
(AP and DY), Bolivia (BP and CY), Brazil (CP and
BY), Mexico (DP and AY). As the reader can see,
there is no clear-cut trade-off between inflation
and output, even in the short run, except on some
occasions after stabilization.
We began this article by posing four ques-
tions, and our discussion has led to their answers.
First, why is inflation an issue worth considering?
We answer this question by examining the real costs
of inflation and stabilization. We point out that by
taking into account the plausible adverse growth
effect of inflation through resource misallocation,
the welfare costs of even moderate inflations may
not be negligible. We also recognize the real costs
associated with stabilization in several high-inflation
episodes but find these adverse macroeconomic
effects to be mostly temporary.
Our second question was, Why has inflation
been so chronically high for several Latin American
countries? We found the answer by constructing a
model to show that the spiral-like adjustment of
the government budget deficit and monetary
expansion may result in an inflation trap, which
represents a dynamically stable equilibrium with
persistently high inflation.
The third question asked was, What are the
main causes of those inflationary episodes? For
the answer, we hypothesize that the main causes
of chronically high inflation include continuous
fiscal and monetary expansion, a productivity
slowdown, a systematic undervaluation of the
domestic currency, and diminished credibility.
Finally, in attempting to answer the last ques-
tion—why some of these countries have been
able to stabilize inflation successfully, while others
have not—we note that stabilization succeeded in
ending the hyperinflationary episode of Bolivia in
1985, essentially because of a tight-money policy
that was made possible by a budgetary adjustment
and market liberalization program that ensured
credibility, and by a proper anchor for inflation
that used the (unified) nominal exchange rate. In
terms of our model, this stabilization program
fundamentally changed the equilibrium money
market relationship, thus enabling the Bolivian
economy to jump out of the inflation trap. A
similar stabilization story emerged to a certain
degree over the past two years in Argentina. Yet
note that, in common with the most successfully
stabilizing nations, both countries attempted
several programs before stabilization succeeded,
implying that both an appropriate prescription
and proper timing are necessary for success. Not
all stabilization programs have that combination,
however, and thus some economies remain in the
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